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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant, by and
through her counsel of record hereby submits the following petition in support ot her request lui
rrhcvifinp
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT'S OPINION INCORRECTLY ASSERTS THAI I III
PARENTAL PRESUMPTION WAS REBUTTED AND THAT
HEATHER FAILED TO CHALLENGE THAT CONCLUSION

The opinion ot the LuLIit incorrectly asserts llut Ikvtlli. ,1 ,1 , I ijialluigt Hi. I .ill i i I
conclusion that if the trial court had applied the parental presumption, the appellee ("Brad")
effectively rebutted the presumption In her brief to this Couit, 1 leather strenuously argued that
Brad failed to rebut the parental presumption Brief of the Appellant, pp. 20-26, attached hereto.
Indeed, Heather included nearly six fiill pages of argument in her brief to this Court challenging
tin
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acknowledge that Heather did indeed challenge the trial court's erroneous conclusion

Utah law has long recognized a presumption favoring natural parents over non-natural
parents in custody disputes. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982); Walton v.
Coffinan, 169 P.2d 97 (Utah 1946). The rationale for presuming that custody should lie with
natural parents over other persons is "rooted in the common experience of mankind, which teaches
that parent and child normally share a strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural
parent will normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural
parent is normally more sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the confidence and
love of the child than anyone else." Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 40. However, the parental
presumption is not always conclusive and can be rebutted in certain cases. Id.
Hutchinson, sets forth the three-pronged test that must be applied before the long-standing
and well-reasoned presumption can be rebutted. "The parental presumption can be rebutted only
by evidence establishing that... a parent... lacks all three of the characteristics that give rise to
the presumption: that no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a
willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and welfare for the child's and that the parent lacks
the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally." Id.
(emphasis added). The presumption "cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the
opposing party possesses superior qualifications, has established a deeper bond with the child, or
is able to provide more desirable circumstances." Id.
In this case, the trial court concluded that even if it had applied the parental presumption,
Brad rebutted it. The trial court's conclusion is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion
because it is not supported by the evidence. Contrary to the rule set forth in Hutchinson, the trial
court based its conclusion on which person, in its view, would be the better custodian. To
accomplish this purpose, the trial court concocted findings of fact which are not supported by the
evidence and then proceeded to make Conclusions of Law on the basis of its own concoted
findings. The trial court did not establish that Heather was lacking all three qualities giving rise to
the natural parent presumption.
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The trial court stated its inability Mto conclude that the defendant's [Heather's] bond to the
children is strong, because she chose to have an affair with a married man and pursue her own
needs to the detriment and sacrifice of the needs of her minor children." Conclusions of Law, fl4,
attached hereto. Heather's unsubstantiated affair does not prove that she had no strong bond with
her children or that she put her own needs above those of her children. The court based its
conclusion on its own bias and moral judgment against the defendant.
The evidence shows that Heather had a strong bond with her children. For example, the
custody evaluator, Mr. Peterson, M.S.W., determined after careful consideration, that the children
are bonded to the Heather (Transcript 541 at p. 39), that she has a willingness to sacrifice her
needs for the needs of the children, and that she does not lack a sympathy for and understanding of
the children that is characteristic of parents generally. Transcript 541 at pp. 33-40, 59. There was
absolutely no evidence contradicting this determination that the court could have relied upon to find
otherwise.
Heather was the children's primary care giver and, according to the custody evaluation,
was extremely focused on the children from the time of the marriage until approximately November
or December of 1994. Transcript 541 at p. 31. However, during this same four year period Mr.
Peterson determined that the appellee was not focused on the children. Id. at 59. It is true that Mr.
Peterson concluded that there were times when each parent was not focused on the children. Id.
However, for Heather this was from November or December of 1994 through March 1995, five
months at most. Id. For Brad there was a period of four whole years when he was not focused on
the children. Id. The custody evaluation recognized that both parties have been focused on the
children since March 1995. Id. at 54. No evidence whatsoever was presented rebutting Mr.
Peterson's determination. It is therefore inconceivable how the trial court concluded there is no
strong bond between Heather and her children given the overwhelming evidence that of the two
parties, she has been predominantly focused on the children and their needs while Brad has not.
It is even more confounding how the trial court concluded in paragraph 30 of the Findings
3

of Fact that Brad's desire for custody was continual and deep when it is undisputed that he was not
focused on the children for four whole years. It was only when Brad was no longer able to ride on
Heather's coattails that he began to focus on the children. Brad's emotional and often physical
absence over four years is in complete contradiction to the court's finding of a deep and continual
desire for custody.
The trial court's conclusion also contradicts the wishes of the children themselves. The
custody evaluator found that the children are bonded to each party equally. Transcript 541 at p.
43. The children enjoy each party equally, and the children desire to be with both sides of the
family. Id. at pp. 44, 54.
In furtherance of its moral judgment against Heather, but against the weight of the
evidence, the trial court concluded that because Heather allegedly had an affair with a married man,
she made a conscious choice to place her individual needs above her children. In direct conflict
with the findings of the trial court is the determination by the custody evaluator that both parties
were equally likely to stop what they were doing to help the children with their homework. Id. at
pp. 41-42.
Heather also demonstrated her willingness to sacrifice her own needs by foregoing
employment until January 1995. Prior to January 1995, she was the person who performed the
housework, cleaning, shopping and laundry. Transcript 541 at pp. 157-59. She also took the
children to and from their activities and doctor appointments and spent a significant amount of time
helping Alex with his homework. Id. Heather did all of these things in sacrifice of her own needs
and desires.
In addition, Heather demonstrated her willingness to sacrifice her own needs for those of
her children by traveling extensively every day just to be with the children. Heather lives in
Riverton and Brad lives in West Valley City. Nonetheless, Heather has consistently picked the
children up from Brad, taken them to school, picked them up after school and thereafter taken the
children back to Brad when she goes to work. Heather has traveled approximately 200 miles per
4

presumption and should therefore be awarded custody of all three children.

II,

HEATHER

SHOULD BE A L L O W E D TO ASSERT THE NATURAL
PARENT PRESUMPTION BECAUSE BRAD IS NOT THE
NATl Jl A I • OR ADOPTFXI FATHER OF HEATHER'S SON, I I EX

This Court should reconsider its decision to affirm the trial court's custody determination in
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natural parent presumption. Utah law ha:> a long-standing presumpikui n\ai custody should lie
with natural parents over non-natural parents. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38. This presumption, as

stronger bond for her children, will be more willing to sacrifice her needs for those of her children,
and be better able to sympathize with and understand her children than a non-parent. Id at 40.

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which allows an individual to "marry, establish
a home and bring up children" without state interference. Meyers i'.. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
/M,? •.
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Court have set precedent which narrows and makes illusory, the natui A ; ..:ent presumption.
Narrowing the parental presumption in such a manner violates a natural parent's Constitutional
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Of course the natural parent presumption is not conclusive, Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 40.
To overcome the natural parent presumption it must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
1 \ I I I :: \ \ e v ei , it is simplj ilk gical to conclude that the natural parent p r o . . .u>- ..a:, ne waived,
otherwise there would be no practical purpose for the presumption in the first place. Presumptions
must be rebutted, they cannot be waived. The law is full of presumptions, for example an
indi idi lal is pi esumed innocent I intilpi oven guilt;

I his presumpuon

be waived. It simply is illogical to assume a legal
natural parent presumption must be rebutted, not war
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imption can be waived. Similarly, the
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right tc • custody couk o-w ivii^ivJ illusory and .. SiJJ it me child's umuiai H^IK LO be reared, where
6

possible, by his or her natural parent." Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 40.

both Heather and Brad on equal footing. In other words, the court treated Brad as if he were
Alex's natural or adoptive father when in reality he was not. All that Brad did was amend Alex's

an adoption.
Utah's legislature has proscribed several requirements that must be met before one can
^ ^

supporting case law establish that the adoption statutes must be strictly complied with before an
adoption can be accomplished.
For example, .\:;. ^u, ; .K
consent requirements.

S§78-30-4.14 & 78-30-4.18. AH step-parents wishing to adopt a

spouse's child must file a petition in the appropriate court. VC A $78-30-7 It is also necessary
:..~

aaoptive parent or parents

,; \; un

s

U.C.A. §78-30-8. Furthermore, the court cannot grant an order for adoption unless it examines
each person involved in the adoption proiwdin? and determines that the adoption is in the best
interest of me ctinu

. . .

The court's have also determined that strict compliance with Utah's adoption statutes is
necessary to protect "l" '' '

v^r-fthrr 1
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father and step-mother for over nine years and had no knowledge that his step-mother was not his

the step-mother requested the court to allow the proceeding to continue without requiring the child
to appear as mandated by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-30-8, Id.
The court refnsed
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opinion that the statute should be strictly adhered u>. ,,, Specifically, the court "conclude[d] that
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the appearance requirement of the person adopting the child, the child adopted and the consenting
parent must be sti Icily cc nsti u ?< /and is jui isdictionallj i eq

-mi--: the

court stated "without compliance, the adoption could be nullified
In Taylor v. Waddoups, 241 P.2d 157 (Utah 1952), the Utah Supreme Court did just that

physical custody of her child u > me adoptive parents. 1 ne moihei Had given her signed consent
before a notary public but the adoption statutes required such consent be given before the court.

that the consent was not legal because it was not signed in the presence of the court. Id. <</ 160.
As a result, the natural mother was entitled to have her child returned to her.

undisputed that he did not follow the required procedures. Although Brad stated that he believed
he could adopt Alex by amending the birth certificate, this is not sufficient to effectuate an

strictly followed if plaintiff were able to stand >. \h: same position as Heather, Alex's nat - J
mother. Heather's Constitutional rights have also been violated by the trial court's refusal to assert
1.... ,..:; iirai parent presumpti ;: inn
III.

HEATHER SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROVIDE DAY CARE FOR
THE CHILDRF%T ^

Heather should be allowed i n

^ r \ ^ TS CTVEN CI JSTODY
\ v c ;y care for her children if Brad is awarded custody.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-33 provides in its advisory guidelines that "parental care shall
be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the
parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to provide child care."
U.C.A. § 30-3-33(13) (1995) (emphasis added) Alth
day care for her children, the court dino evidence was presented to reb

-•• ! )c

-:s wiHin-j and able

ide

ae presumption in favor ot parental day care and
except for the findings invented by the court.

t
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The trial court's decision to deny Heather's request to provide child care for her children
constitutes an abuse of discretion because it contradicts the overwhelming evidence that it is in the
children's best interest that Heather spend time with them. Mr. Peterson, in the custody
evaluation, determined that it was in the best interest of the children for the parents to have joint
legal custody and suggested that Heather care for the children in the mornings and that the parties
work out other ways to share the children. Transcript 541 at pp. 23-25. Mr. Peterson also stated
that it was important for Heather to be highly involved with her children's lives. Id. The trial
court's determination contradicts the evidence and defeats the recommendations of Mr. Peterson
who is indisputably highly qualified to make custody determinations. Indeed, the courts' decision
to deny Heather's request to provide day care will hurt the children since it severely limits the
amount of time Heather can contribute to her children's lives.
IV,

THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARDED INSUFFICIENT ALIMONY

This court should reconsider its decision to affirm the trial court's award of $350.00 per
month alimony which is severely inadequate to meet Heather's financial needs and was calculated
as a punishment and moral judgment against her. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(7)(a)
enumerates the following four factors that rial courts must consider in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1953, as amended). The trial court's alimony award manifests a clear
abuse of discretion because Heather has a demonstrated financial need and little earning capacity or
ability to produce income, whereas, Brad has the ability to pay. Alimony should also be awarded
for a long enough period and in an amount large enough to allow Heather to become self-sufficient
and avoid becoming dependent on public assistance.
Heather is employed as a waitress making at most $840.00 per month and has expenses of
$1,250.00 per month. Findings of Fact f 4. Heather has always been employed in meager jobs
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and lacks the education to improve her status. In comparison, Brad makes at least $3,300.00 per
month. Brad has had the good fortune of working at well paying jobs. When the alimony award is
taken into consideration with Heather's child support obligation and the amounts that she will have
to pay for day care and insurance coverage for the children, there is no realistic way that Heather
will be able to meet the most basic of her needs. Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). This court should reconsider awarding alimony of at least $500.00 per month and should
extend the length of time that alimony is to be paid so that Heather can become self-sufficient and
avoid having to depend on public assistance.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
AWARD HEATHER SUFFICIENT ATTORNEYS FEES

The award of $1000.00 for attorneys fees is severely inadequate and constitutes an abuse
of discretion because it drastically deviates from the amount shown as reasonable by the evidence.
Heather demonstrated her financial need, Brad's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees. The trial court should have been more reasonable in its award of attorneys fees
based on this evidence.
At the time of trial Heather's attorney submitted an affidavit establishing attorneys fees of
$6,819.00. The billing rate was $120.00 per hour which is well within community standards for
the type of work and services performed. These services were necessitated because of the legal
issues which were involved. There was no objection to the affidavit of attorneys fees and no
cross-examination or rebuttal. Heather makes at most $840.00 per month and is without the
means to pay her attorneys fees of nearly $7000.00
In comparison, Brad has an income of at least $3,300.00 per month. Clearly, he is far
more able to pay Heather's attorneys fees. The trial court's award of a mere $1000.00 hardly
makes a dent in Heather's reasonable attorneys fees of almost seven times that amount. Because
Brad is able to pay and because Heather has demonstrated her financial need, this Court should
reconsider the trial court's award of attorney fees. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 699 P.2d 406 (Utah
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1983).
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Court should reconsider its opinion affirming the trial court's decision. Contrary to
this Court's opinion, Heather did indeed challenge the trial court's erroneous conclusion that if it
had applied the natural presumption, Brad rebutted it. The overwhelming evidence shows that
Heather does not lack all three qualities giving rise to the natural parent presumption. The custody
evaluation clearly found that Heather had a strong bond with her children, that she was willing to
sacrifice her own needs for those of her children, and that she possessed the sympathy and
understanding characteristic of a natural parent. The court's findings that Heather was mean,
vindictive and that she emotionally and verbally abused the children are not supported by the
record.
By refusing to allow Heather to assert the natural parent presumption the trial court has
infringed on Heather's fundamental right to raise her own children. In essence, the trial court
treated Brad on equal footing with Heather although he is not Alex's natural or adopted father.
Brad may have thought he adopted Alex by putting his name on Alex's birth certificate but this
does not effectuate an adoption in Utah. It is against public policy for the trial court to have treated
Brad as if he adopted Alex when Utah's adoption statutes require strict compliance. Because Brad
did not ever adopt Alex, Heather should be able to assert the natural parent presumption.
This Court should also reconsider its opinion and the evidence in support of allowing
Heather to provide day care to her children if Brad is awarded custody. The custody evaluation
clearly stated that it was in the best interest of the children that the parents have joint custody and
suggested that Heather care for the children in the mornings. Furthermore, the custody evaluation
determined that it was important for Heather to be highly involved in her children's lives. In light
of the custody evaluation and the statutory advisory guidelines requiring courts to encourage the
noncustodial parent to take part in day care, the trial court erroneously denied Heather's request to
provide work related day care for her children.
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The award of only $350.00 per month in alimony is highly inequitable given the disparate
financial situations of the parties. Heather clearly demonstrated her financial need and inability to
provide her own income due to her limited education and training. In comparison, Brad has a good
paying job and makes at least $3,300.00 per month. When considering Heather's limited income
in addition her share of child support and day care expenses an award of merely $350.00 per
month is harshly inadequate. An award of at least $500.00 per month over a period of four years
is necessary to allow Heather to become self-sufficient and avoid becoming dependant on
government assistance.
Similarly, the financial situation of the parties clearly demonstrates the severe inadequacy of
a mere $1000.00 awarded Heather for attorneys fees. This is especially true given the fact that
Heather has incurred reasonable attorneys fees of almost seven times that amount. There is no
realisitc way that Heather who is on a very limited income can even begin paying her reasonable
attorneys fees. Brad is much more able to pay the attorneys fees and this court should reconsider
its opinion affirming the trial court's inadequate award of attorneys fees.
For these reasons and as set forth above, the appellee respectfully requests this Court to
reconsider its opinion.
Dated: this 28th day of October, 1998.
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I, Randy S. Ludlow, attorney for appellant, certify that this rehearing request is made in
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